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Abstract This paper considers mission assurance for criti-
cal cloud applications, a set of applications with growing im-
portance to governments and military organizations. Specif-
ically, we consider applications in which assigned tasks or
duties are performed in accordance with an intended pur-
pose or plan in order to accomplish an assured mission.
Mission-critical cloud computing may possibly involve hy-
brid (public, private, heterogeneous) clouds and require the
realization of “end-to-end” and “cross-layered” security, de-
pendability, and timeliness. We propose the properties and
building blocks of a middleware for assured cloud comput-
ing that can support critical missions. In this approach, we
assume that mission critical cloud computing must be de-
signed with assurance in mind. In particular, the middleware
in such systems must include sophisticated monitoring, as-
sessment of policies, and response to manage the configura-
tion and management of dynamic systems-of-systems with
both trusted and partially trusted resources (data, sensors,
networks, computers, etc.) and services sourced from multi-
ple organizations.
Keywords Cloud computing · Mission assurance ·
Security · Middleware · Monitoring
1 Introduction
Rapid technological advancements, global networking, com-
mercial off-the-shelf technology, security, agility, scalabil-
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ity, reliability, and mobility create a window of opportu-
nity for reducing the costs of computation. But mission-
critical cloud computing across hybrid (public, private, het-
erogeneous) clouds requires the realization of “end-to-end”
and “cross-layered” security, dependability, and timeliness.
That is, computations and computing systems should sur-
vive malicious attacks and accidental failures; they should
be secure, and they should execute in a timely manner. End-
to-end implies that the properties should hold throughout
the lifetime of individual events, e.g., a packet transit or a
session between two machines, and that they should be as-
sured in a manner that is independent of the environment
through which such events pass. Similarly, cross-layer en-
compasses multiple layers from the end-device through the
network and up to the applications or computations at the
data center. A survivable and distributed cloud-computing-
based infrastructure requires the configuration and manage-
ment of dynamic systems-of-systems with both trusted and
partially trusted resources (data, sensors, networks, comput-
ers, etc.) and services sourced from multiple organizations.
To assure mission-critical computations and workflows that
rely on such dynamically configured systems-of-systems,
we must ensure that a given configuration does not vio-
late any security or reliability requirements. Furthermore,
we should be able to model the trustworthiness of a work-
flow or computation’s completion for a given configuration
in order to specify the right configuration for high assur-
ances.
This paper discusses the architecture and design for mid-
dleware platforms to support assured cloud computing. We
describe our implementation of such a middleware centered
on policy-based event monitoring and dynamic reactions,
and we highlight the other important research areas whose
development is fundamental for creating assured cloud com-
puting systems.
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2 Assured cloud computing
The paradigm of cloud computing is changing the way
in which organizations use storage and computational re-
sources to support their activities. Cloud computing solu-
tions have been introduced for data analysis [10, 15], for
large-scale distributed storage, for running high-traffic web-
sites, and for high-performance computing (HPC) [32]. The
ability of scaling, the limited capital investment, and econ-
omy of scale are continuing to increase the types of ap-
plications that run on cloud computing resources. A recent
outage of a small part of Amazon Web Services (AWS)
showed how several small and large organizations rely
on a such infrastructure to provide services to their cus-
tomers [26].
Interactions between cloud users and cloud providers are
regulated by agreements. Cloud users specify the amount
of resources that they require, and cloud providers agree to
provide a minimum level of quality of services when giving
access to such resources. These agreements are represented
by Service Level Agreements (SLAs) and, more recently,
by regulatory compliance [3]. SLAs generally use metrics
such as availability, response time, and error-rate to define
the level of service. Regulatory compliance, on the other
hand, is a process ensuring that cloud providers implement
a minimal level of security by implementing specific secu-
rity processes and security configurations on their infrastruc-
ture. Security-focused cloud solutions are already being in-
troduced in the market [21].
However, the guarantees provided by SLAs and compli-
ance are defined in general for entire classes of services.
Many modern applications require strong guarantees on the
ability of cloud systems to provide reliable and secure ser-
vices with requirements that are dynamic and might change
for each service call. For example, services such as crit-
ical communication systems [7], real-time image analysis
for Unmanned Air Vehicles (UAVs) and stock exchanges
require cloud systems that have strict real-time, availabil-
ity, and security requirements and need to be negotiated and
guaranteed for the duration of the service. The Air Force
defines such strict requirements as the base for “mission as-
surance.” DoD Directive 3020.40 [11] defines Mission As-
surance (MA) as “a process to ensure that assigned tasks
or duties can be performed in accordance with the intended
purpose or plan.”
A cloud computing solution able to provide mission as-
surance [16] enables a wide range of applications that cur-
rent cloud systems are not yet able to support. To provide
the necessary guarantees, a mission-assured cloud comput-
ing solution requires processes that ensure continued per-
formance in face of real world security threats, and compute
real-time risk assessments. It should then utilize this real-
time insight within the fabrics of the cloud to ensure con-
tinued availability of services at satisfactory service level
agreements.
Services in the cloud are provided through the composi-
tion of several independent applications. A middleware so-
lution would provide the proper support for the dynamic re-
organization and monitoring of these applications to ensure
meeting the minimum requirements. Given the request for
a service, the sequence of interactions that produce the re-
sponse is organized in a workflow. Each request provides a
specific SLA and a set of security properties. The goal of a
middleware for assured cloud computing is to compose this
information and guarantee that the overall system is able to
meet the mission requirements even in the presence of faults
and of security problems.
We identify three properties that assured cloud comput-
ing needs to provide: security, availability, and real-time
guarantees. Research has been performed in each individ-
ual area, but a complete integration of these techniques in
an overall framework is still missing.
Security: The critical nature of mission-oriented comput-
ing requires assurances on the protection of the system from
malicious users. Several thread models can be considered
when looking at security in the cloud. Previous work analy-
ses the security guarantees that can be provided when the
cloud provider itself is untrusted. Techniques such as the
proof of storage allow verifying that cloud providers are
storing data correctly [18], and that the minimal level of re-
dundancy in the storage is guaranteed [8]. Other work intro-
duces mechanisms for preserving the confidentiality of data.
For example, data can be separated in private data and public
data. Public data can be processed in a public cloud, while
private data are processed in a private cloud [33]. Cryptog-
raphy, with homomorphic encryption, provides the theoreti-
cal ability of preserving confidentiality during data process-
ing by allowing computation over encrypted data [14]. Other
techniques consider the case in which the cloud provider is
trusted, but other users are potentially malicious. Techniques
have been introduced to increase the isolation between Vir-
tual Machines running on the same host [29]. Other tech-
niques are used for increasing the security of VMs by moni-
toring the operation of systems to detect compromises [13].
A middleware managing assured cloud applications
should be able to combine these techniques to provide the
required level of confidentiality and integrity to the service.
For example, the security requirements of a request could
mandate the confidentiality of the data from cloud providers.
In such a case, the middleware should use encryption over
the data. In another example, a cloud user might request the
creation of a virtual machine for providing a critical ser-
vice. Such a virtual machine should be subject to detailed
analysis by the cloud provider to ensure that it has not been
J Internet Serv Appl (2012) 3:87–94 89
compromised. The middleware should be able to estimate
the performance tradeoffs between applying such additional
security protections and the real-time characteristics of the
system.
Availability: Faults are inevitable in large systems. Hence,
guaranteeing availability in the presence of faults is a criti-
cal property for assured cloud systems. Faults can be simple
such as the failure of a hard drive, or can arise from complex
and unexpected interactions between services. Replication
is a solution for providing the required level of availability,
however, naive replication strategies might not be sufficient
for surviving complex faults. For example, Amazon’s post-
mortem descriptions of their availability problems provide
us with interesting insights on the causes of large-scale out-
ages. In 2008, a single bit error in a gossip message caused
a large-scale availability problem in S3 [2]. More recently, a
network configuration change triggered a large and unneces-
sary data replication that caused the EBS service to become
unavailable. The problem cascaded and affected Amazon’s
Computation Cloud (EC2) and their Relational Database
Service (RDS) [4]. Since preventing such issues is challeng-
ing, an assured cloud computing middleware needs to pro-
vide fault tolerance mechanisms for reducing the effects of
such problems, for example, by isolating faults or providing
checkpointing support.
Real-time: A wide range of applications such as commu-
nication, voice processing, or image analysis require time
guarantees on the service response time. Previous work in
the area of Web Services shows several solutions to the
problem of monitoring the performance characteristics spec-
ified in a SLA [28], how to negotiate the SLAs of multi-
ple services [34], and how these violations can be predi-
cated automatically so that the service provider can act ac-
cordingly [19]. An assured computing middleware solution
needs to integrate these capabilities and extend them to func-
tion at large scale and in a multi-tenancy environment (i.e.,
multiple cloud users sharing the same cloud infrastructure).
In the field of data analysis, previous work introduced sys-
tems providing deadline driven scheduling for data process-
ing in map/reduce clusters. These scheduling systems intro-
duce guarantees on when a particular computation is going
to be completed [31]. More research is needed to extend
these guarantees to different types of distributed applications
and evaluate how real-time guarantees can be provided even
when faults and attacks are present.
Software is the fundamental piece that enables assured
cloud computing. The security, availability, and real-time
components are reflected in the software that manages
the cloud. Such a software substrate is going to include
software-defined networking as a management mechanism
for cloud networks [30]. There is a strong need for a middle-
ware solutions that supports such an integrated management.
3 Monitoring in assured cloud computing
A middleware for supporting assured cloud computing
needs to enable applications to run in a secure, dependable,
and timely fashion. In order to obtain this goal, the mid-
dleware needs to support applications for the management
of the configuration of dynamic system-of-systems, the de-
tection of security problems, and the dynamic mapping of
workflow tasks. Supporting these applications requires hav-
ing mechanisms for acquiring information about the system.
Hence, monitoring is a fundamental task for both cloud
users and cloud providers of assured cloud computing.
Without monitoring, a system is blind and unable to react
to ensure meeting all the security and timeliness require-
ments. Monitoring ensures that the cloud system is operat-
ing within an assured level of service by providing informa-
tion about the operations and about the state of each compo-
nent.
Policies are an important tool for describing security and
reliability requirements of the cloud infrastructure. Policies
specify allowed configurations on the infrastructure and aim
at guaranteeing a minimal level of security, reliability, and
service. For example, simple policies are used today for
expressing the security requirements of PCI-DSS [27] or
FISMA [25]. These policies are expressed as access con-
trol policies, or they are expressed over the configuration of
the infrastructure itself. While access control policies can
be enforced at the application level, a large set of secu-
rity controls need to be enforced at the infrastructure level:
valid system configurations, network access control rules,
access to systems, redundancy guarantees, or the presence
of vulnerable software are properties that need to be mon-
itored below the application level. These characteristics of
the system are accessible through network security man-
agement tools such as SNMP, network scanners, or can be
accessed through dedicated monitoring tools added to ap-
plications or operating systems. Information provided by
these tools can be integrated by a middleware software run-
ning at the application level (e.g., to acquire workflow task
placements, website traffic), at the OS level (e.g., running
processes, network connection), and at the VM level (e.g.,
load of VMs, IO, and trusted information about VMs behav-
ior).
While this information provides a low-level view of what
is happening in the system, more processing is needed to
make sense of such information in term of compliance to
policies. Events that represent changes in the state of the
system might need to be correlated across the entire sys-
tem in order to detect violations of these policies. Such a
middleware needs to be scalable and secure from attacks.
Moreover, as cloud systems are not completely managed
by a single organization, such a monitor middleware needs
to provide functionalities for sharing monitoring informa-
tion across organization boundaries. While current network
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Fig. 1 The general architecture
of the Middleware for Assured
Clouds (Sect. 4), and the related
research tracks (Sect. 6)
management solutions [12] and event-based systems [20]
provide a partial solution to some of the aspects of these
problems, verifying that they are able to satisfy all the re-
quirements of this new type of middleware remains a chal-
lenge.
Real-time and scalability: The distribution of monitoring
load is at the base of obtaining a scalable and real-time mon-
itoring. Cloud operators are already managing systems com-
posed of tens of thousands of machines. Detailed monitor-
ing of the security state of an infrastructure could require
accessing information such as running programs, network
connections, Syslog events, and application-level events like
requested pages in a web servers, logins in SSH servers, or
database queries. Millions of events can be generated each
second and need to be processed for detecting violations
from the assured characteristics of the system. The monitor-
ing system should be able to detect such violations in near
real-time in order to initiate a proper response.
Availability and security: Since the information collected
by the monitoring system is at the base of the assured opera-
tion of cloud systems, attacks that compromise it directly
affect the operations of the infrastructure. Attacks on the
availability of the system can reduce the ability to detect at-
tacks or to perform operations such as workflow placement.
Attacks on the confidentiality of the monitoring system al-
low an attack to acquire critical information about the secu-
rity state that can enable additional attacks. Attacks on the
integrity of the system can hide malicious behavior and in-
ject false information. If this information is then used for
reaction, it can create problems for the integrity and avail-
ability of the provided services. Monitoring systems should
be designed with “need-to-know” and “separation-of-duty”
principles because such a design can limit the effects that
security compromises have on the infrastructure they moni-
tor.
Information sharing: The composition of services for the
execution of the workflow requires the integration of infor-
mation about the infrastructure managed by cloud providers
and the infrastructure managed by cloud users. For example,
the validation of policies imposed on the cloud-user systems
might depend on information provided by the cloud provider
such as colocation with other virtual machines, load of other
nodes in the same physical node, or security state of the ma-
chines provided services. A monitoring middleware needs
to be able to share the necessary information for validating
policies without providing access to the entire state of the
system.
4 A “middleware for assured clouds”
Our research in Assured Cloud Computing involves three
main tracks, as depicted in Fig. 1. In this section, we de-
scribe the general architecture of the Middleware for As-
sured Clouds (MAC). The MAC middleware is comprised
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Fig. 2 Monitoring capabilities need to be deployed at multiple levels
in the cloud architecture: application, guest VMs, and host VMs
of four major components, which will be described in detail
in the rest of this section.
4.1 DORA subsystem
The core of the monitoring system is composed of a set of
software agents that receive events and correlate them to de-
tect when policies are violated. These agents operate and ac-
quire information at different levels in the cloud-computing
architecture, as shown in Fig. 2. Additionally, special agents
(such as the NetOdessa agent [6]) run on special devices
such as OpenFlow controllers.
We propose several techniques that exploit the policy-
based nature of compliance monitoring in the cloud to ad-
dress several of the challenges we presented in distributing
monitoring load and introducing redundancy. The architec-
ture of each middleware component is shown in Fig. 3. The
local software agent running on each VM monitors the state
of the local system by acquiring information through differ-
ent mechanisms such as SNMP, Syscalls, or VM introspec-
tion. Agents perform a partial processing of policies using
a local inference engine, and use the network to exchange
information with the other monitoring agents that are part of
the middleware.
Policies are expressed as rules over the configurations
and state of resources in the system, such as hosts, network
devices, or applications. The policies and the state infor-
mation are expressed using Datalog [9]. Policies are repre-
sented as Datalog rules, and the state is represented using
facts. Events mark changes in the state of the system by pro-
viding information concerning changes in the state of a re-
source. Agents monitor only events relevant to the purpose
of validating compliance to the given policies. Examples of
events are establishing a new connection, running a new ser-
vice, or creating a new guest VM. As an example of policy,
a simple policy could specify that critical services should
not be run on an insecure machine. We express this policy
in Datalog as follows:
critical_service(C), runs_program(H, C),
insecure(H) → fail(C, H)
Fig. 3 High-level architecture of the monitoring agent, part of the mid-
dleware running on guest VMs and host VMs
In this rule, C and H are variables representing re-
sources, and runs_program is a statement that is part of
the system’s state and changed by events. The two state-
ments critical_service and insecure can either
be events generated by local agents or can be inferred us-
ing policies from other events.
By taking advantage of the intuition that events de-
scribe information about the state of resources in the sys-
tem (e.g., critical_service) or their relations (e.g.,
runs_program), our middleware performs optimizations
aimed at reducing the monitoring load and at increasing se-
curity.
First, each local agent identifies the portion of each pol-
icy that relates to a single type of resource. If events related
to such a resource are generated only locally on the device
monitored by the agent, the validation of compliance to this
policy is partially processed within the agent itself [23]. Sec-
ond, a similar analysis of the relations between policies and
resources is used to define a distributed protocol for vali-
dating compliance when events are generated by multiple
agents. Resources are mapped to different nodes in the sys-
tem, and policies are interpreted as describing undesirable
relations between resources having specific states. The de-
tection of violations is performed by having nodes exchange
information in a way consistent with the relation described
by the policies. This algorithm does not require aggregating
information in any static centralized or hierarchical struc-
ture [22]. This leads to high-scalability and low overhead in
monitoring.
Our architecture addresses the security challenges in two
ways. We use redundancy in monitoring to validate critical
parts of the policy (e.g., by acquiring information from both
guest VMs and host VMs), and we use byzantine replication
at multiple levels for ensuring that a compromised compo-
nent cannot compromise the integrity of the entire monitor-
ing infrastructure [23]. The local processing of the policy
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and the distributed policy validation algorithm implement a
“need-to-know” principle. Events are sent to different nodes
only if such an action is required for validating policies.
This reduces the information about the system stored in each
node. Consequently, it reduces the effects of compromised
nodes on the confidentiality of the monitoring system [22].
4.2 External event aggregators
OpenFlow switches, routers, intrusion detection systems
(IDS), or legacy applications generate events and might not
be able to run on top of our middleware infrastructure. How-
ever, acquiring such events is important to validate policies
that encompass their state. The external event aggregators
translate events from different sources and wrap them into a
common format and send them to the DORA subsystem.
4.3 Risk assessment modules
The MAC middleware provides continuous risk assessments
on the state of the system.
The first module, the “trust calculation module,” is mod-
eled after [17], where the authors present an approach to
a formal-semantics-based calculus of trust, and is used in
MAC for real-time estimation of trustworthiness as a risk
assessment mechanism. Trust is defined as “a conditional
belief, represented as a probability distribution over three
states: trust, distrust, and untrust.” The module provides
a systematic method of assessing the trustworthiness of
a workflow by considering trustworthiness of its compo-
nents and propagating them. It also provides mechanism to
use quantified uncertainty to choose whether to accept the
risks that trust implies.
The second module, the “distance from compliance cal-
culation,” estimates the effects of malfunctioning in the
monitoring system [24]. If a part of the monitoring system is
compromised or unavailable, changes in the state might be
not detected. This module uses the current state of the sys-
tem to compute a risk proportional to the number of events
that, if undetected, would lead the system to operate in an
undesirable state.
4.4 Reaction agents
Once the middleware detects a violation of the requirements
that might impact the ability of the system to operate suc-
cessfully, the system should react in a timely manner to cor-
rect the situation. The monitoring system can communicate
with specific reaction agents and provide information such
as the type of violation that has been detected and the set
of events, configurations, and devices which are responsible
for the presence of the violation. Using such information, the
reaction modules perform changes in the state of the system.
In our implementation, we use OpenFlow to adapt network
access control policies to the state of the infrastructure. Our
reaction agent [6] receives information about specific secu-
rity violations and authorizes network flows consequently.
5 Open issues and challenges
There are still open research issues which we have not ad-
dressed in our current MAC design. These issues are related
to the design of the middleware architecture and the defini-
tion of security policies for assured cloud environments.
The current MAC middleware needs to be extended
to address completely the problem caused by the system-
of-systems aspects of cloud environments. A real-world
cloud computing infrastructure is a complex, heterogeneous
system-of-systems. Aside from performance issues, the het-
erogeneity means that different components of the system
might be vulnerable to different threats and, therefore, the
risk assessment and management processes should consider
these differences.
Risk assessments and security of the MAC middleware
itself are still open research issues. Research is needed
to integrate techniques that increase our confidence that
the information provided by the monitoring agent is cor-
rect. This issue is similar to the classic problem of “who
checks the checker.” One possible approach is the use of
hardware-based root-of-trust techniques based on commer-
cial solutions such as Intel® V-pro and Intel® Trusted Exe-
cution Technology (Intel® TXT) that utilizes Intel® trusted
platform module (TPM). Additionally, the system could
use possible redundancies in the monitoring information to
“monitor itself” using separation-of-duty principles to en-
sure that monitoring components are behaving correctly.
Metrics for the security of the monitoring itself are
needed for comparing different monitoring systems. Such
measures should express quantitatively the effects that at-
tacks on the monitoring systems have on the monitoring it-
self and on the system being monitored. For example, these
metrics should account for the presence of critical compo-
nents in the system being monitored and the effects that a
compromise of the monitoring system would cause on such
components.
Using these measures, we would be able to express prop-
erties such as that the difficulty of attacking a system should
scale with the size of the system and cost of a successful at-
tack (i.e., attacking the monitoring of a large, complex sys-
tem should be as hard as attacking the one of a small system,
given equal cost of a successful attack).
Other research issues are related to the identification of
an appropriate set of security policies for the assured cloud
environment. More studies are needed to study the nature
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of the policies that should be enforced by the MAC mid-
dleware. This problem is complicated by the fact that cur-
rently it is challenging to identify the effectiveness of poli-
cies in increasing the overall security of the system. Us-
ing numerical definition of assurance, it might be possible
to verify their effects on the actual assurance values. An-
other solution for the identification of policies could be pro-
vided by data mining techniques. These techniques could be
used for gaining knowledge from massive amounts of sys-
tem logs.
Last, distributing policies throughout the different parts
of the middleware might present several challenges. Sign-
ing policies and distributing them might not be sufficient for
ensuring that policies are applied correctly, as the PKI ar-
chitecture would become the central point of failure of the
entire monitoring process.
6 Other research projects involved in assured clouds
Research in the design of a middleware for assured cloud
computing should analyze a wide range of issues that go
beyond the system level issues described in this paper [5].
Research is investigating the use of formal methods to de-
sign survivable dynamic distributed architecture that are re-
configured and deployed flexibly to adapt to changing sit-
uations, support environments with varying levels of trust,
and monitor, detect, and respond to threats by deploying ap-
propriate subarchitectures and protocols. In addition, formal
methods are utilized in designing real-time assured algo-
rithms and techniques to enable cloud-based heterogeneous
systems take on mission-critical tasks.
Similarly, formal methods are utilized for analysis of
assured clouds properties. This task is achieved by for-
mally analyzing properties of independent components of
the architecture, e.g., protocols and algorithms. For exam-
ple, cryptographic protocols need to be formally analyzed
for their security properties before placing trust in them and
utilizing them as building blocks of assured clouds. For-
mal analysis tools such as Maude-NPA (used in the de-
sign and analysis of cryptographic protocols of the assured
cloud) and Real-Time Maude (used to analyze network pro-
tocols and sensor network systems) are utilized to achieve
our goals.
Finally, formal methods are used to evaluate quantitative
properties on performance of clouds. This includes various
Quality of Service (QoS) properties, particularly availabil-
ity properties. Questions pertaining to this class of proper-
ties are not amenable to a “true” or “false” answer. Instead,
they require quantitative answers (for example, an interval
of estimated real-time values for the time that it will take to
receive a response in answer to a request). For such quan-
titative properties two tools are used in tandem: probabilis-
tic models specified with probabilistic rewrite rules [1], and
the VesTa statistical model checker and its Maude interface.
VesTa supports statistical model checking of properties in a
quantitative probabilistic temporal logic, whose evaluation
is obtained by Monte Carlo simulation, and hence scalable
in cloud systems.
7 Conclusions
This paper considers the properties and building blocks of
a middleware for critical cloud applications where mission
assurance is a necessity. Such applications include complex
dynamic systems-of-systems, with both trusted or partially
trusted resources (data, sensors, networks, computers, etc.)
and services sourced from multiple organizations. In partic-
ular, this middleware should include sophisticated monitor-
ing, assessment of policy, and handling of the configuration
and management of such complex systems. This paper de-
scribes a distributed monitoring middleware designed using
the principles of need-to-know, separation of duty and re-
dundant verification, and scalability of real-time detection
and response.
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